Delusions and the Background of Rationality

Author: Bortolotti Lisa

Source: Mind & Language, Volume 20, Number 2, April 2005 , pp. 189-208(20)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

:

I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to be met for the background of rationality to be in place.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00282.x

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