In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions

Authors: Bayne Tim; Pacherie Elisabeth

Source: Mind & Language, Volume 20, Number 2, April 2005 , pp. 163-188(26)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

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In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of delusions as beliefs should be retained.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00281.x

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