Context-Sensitive Truth-Theoretic Accounts of Semantic Competence

Author: Steven Gross

Source: Mind & Language, Volume 20, Number 1, February 2005 , pp. 68-102(35)

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Abstract:

According to cognitivist truth-theoretic accounts of semantic competence, aspects of our linguistic behavior can be explained by ascribing to speakers cognition of truth-theories. It's generally assumed on this approach that, however much context-sensitivity speakers’ languages contain, the cognized truth-theories themselves can be adequately characterized context-insensitively—that is, without using in the meta-language expressions whose semantic value can vary across occasions of utterance. In this paper, I explore some of the motivations for and problems and consequences of dropping this assumption.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00278.x

Publication date: 2005-02-01