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Context‐Sensitive Truth‐Theoretic Accounts of Semantic Competence

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According to cognitivist truth‐theoretic accounts of semantic competence, aspects of our linguistic behavior can be explained by ascribing to speakers cognition of truth‐theories. It's generally assumed on this approach that, however much context‐sensitivity speakers’ languages contain, the cognized truth‐theories themselves can be adequately characterized context‐insensitively—that is, without using in the meta‐language expressions whose semantic value can vary across occasions of utterance. In this paper, I explore some of the motivations for and problems and consequences of dropping this assumption.
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Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: 2005-02-01

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