The Limits of Spectatorial Folk Psychology

Author: Daniel D. Hutto

Source: Mind & Language, Volume 19, Number 5, November 2004 , pp. 548-573(26)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

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It is almost universally agreed that the main business of commonsense psychology is that of providing generally reliable predictions and explanations of the actions of others. In line with this, it is also generally assumed that we are normally at theoretical remove from others such that we are always ascribing causally efficacious mental states to them for the purpose of prediction, explanation and control. Building on the work of those who regard our primary intersubjective interactions as a form of ‘embodied practice’, I defend a second-personal approach in this paper.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/j.0268-1064.2004.00272.x

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