Skip to main content

Remarks on Fodor on Having Concepts

Buy Article:

$43.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract: 

Fodor offers a novel argument against Bare‐bones Concept Pragmatism (BCP). He alleges that there are two circularities in BCP's account of concept possession: a circularity in explaining concept possession in terms of the capacity to sort; and a circularity in explaining concept possession in terms of the capacity to draw inferences. We argue that neither of these circles is real.
No References
No Citations
No Supplementary Data
No Data/Media
No Metrics

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, University of South Florida, USA

Publication date: 2004-02-01

  • Access Key
  • Free content
  • Partial Free content
  • New content
  • Open access content
  • Partial Open access content
  • Subscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed content
  • Free trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more