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The Explanatory Need for Mental Representations in Cognitive Science

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Abstract:

Abstract: 

Ramsey (1997) argues that connectionist representations ‘do not earn their explanatory keep’. The aim of this paper is to examine the argument Ramsey gives to support that conclusion. In doing so, I identify two kinds of explanatory need—need relative to a possible explanation and need relative to a true explanation and argue that internal representations are not needed for either connectionist or non‐connectionist possible explanations but that it is quite likely that they are needed for true explanations. However, to show that the latter is the case requires more than a consideration of the form of explanation involved.

Document Type: Original Article

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00235

Affiliations: Rhode Island School of Design, Providence, USA.

Publication date: 2003-09-01

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