Theories of Mind and `The Commonsense View'

Author: Macdonald, Cynthia¹

Source: Mind & Language, Volume 17, Number 5, November 2002 , pp. 467-488(22)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

Key:

- Free Content

- New Content

- Subscribed Content

- Free Trial Content

Abstract:

It is widely believed that people are sometimes directly aware of their own psychological states and consequently better placed than others to know what the contents of those states are. This (`commonsense') view has been challenged by Alison Gopnik. She claims that experimental evidence from the behaviour of 3- and 4-year-old children both supports the theory theory and shows that the belief in direct and privileged knowledge of one's own intentional states is an illusion. I argue (1) that the experimental evidence is not inconsistent with the commonsense view and that Gopnik's central thesis assumes a particularly crude perceptual account of self-knowledge to which that view is not committed, and (2) that the commonsense view is neutral as between the theory theory and other theories of mind.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/1468-0017.00208

Affiliations: 1: University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand c.macdonald@phil.canterbury.ac.nz

The full text electronic article is available for purchase. You will be able to download the full text electronic article after payment.

$41.72 plus tax Refund Policy