@article {Macdonald:November 2002:0268-1064:467,
	author = "Macdonald, Cynthia",
	title = "Theories of Mind and The Commonsense View",
	journal = "Mind & Language",
	volume = "17",
	year = "November 2002",
	abstract = "It is widely believed that people are sometimes directly aware of their own psychological states and consequently better placed than others to know what the contents of those states are. This (`commonsense') view has been challenged by Alison Gopnik. She claims that experimental evidence from the behaviour of 3- and 4-year-old children both supports the theory theory and shows that the belief in direct and privileged knowledge of one's own intentional states is an illusion. I argue (1) that the experimental evidence is not inconsistent with the commonsense view and that Gopnik's central thesis assumes a particularly crude perceptual account of self-knowledge to which that view is not committed, and (2) that the commonsense view is neutral as between the theory theory and other theories of mind.",
	pages = "467-488(22)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2002/00000017/00000005/art00002"
	doi = "doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00208"
}