The Transparency of Experience

Author: Martin, M.G.F.

Source: Mind & Language, Volume 17, Number 4, September 2002 , pp. 376-425(50)

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Abstract:

A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I argue that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sensedatum theories. In the first part of the paper I explore the form of explanation that an intentional theory of perception can offer of this fact, and I contrast this with an alternative picture labelled naïve realism which can also accommodate and explain the fact of transparency. In the second part of the paper I explore the connection between sensory experience and sensory imagining, arguing that various features of sensory imagining support the hypothesis that in visualising a tree one imagines seeing a tree. In the final part of the paper I argue that the conclusion concerning sensory imagination presents an explanatory challenge for intentional theories of perception which parallels the challenge to sense-datum theories.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00205

Affiliations: 1: University College, London michael.martin@ulc.ac.uk

Publication date: 2002-09-01