Skip to main content

Coherence as an Explanation for Theory of Mind Task Failure in Autism

Buy Article:

$51.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)


O’Loughlin and Thagard (2000) present a specific computational implementation of the idea that the problems encountered by a child with autism in classic False Belief tasks derive from a failure to maintain coherence among multiple propositions. They argue that this failure can be explained as a structural feature of a connectionist network attempting to maintain coherence. The current paper criticizes this implementation because it falsely predicts that the same children will have a parallel problem with the False Photographs task. The fact that the content of representations makes a difference while the structure remains constant casts doubt upon their claim.

Document Type: Research Article


Affiliations: 1: Smith College, Northampton, MA email: 2: Smith College, Northampton, MA email: 3: Smith College, Northampton, MA email:

Publication date: June 1, 2002


Access Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content
Cookie Policy
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more