Skip to main content

Functionalism and Self-Consciousness

Buy Article:

$48.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

I offer a philosophically well-motivated work-around for a problem that George Bealer (‘Self-consciousness’, Philosophical Review v. 106, 1997) has identified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism. The problem concerns how to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental predicates occur within the scopes of other mental predicates. My central claim is that the functional roles in terms of which a creature capable of self-consciousness identifies her own mental states must be roles that items could play within creatures whose psychology is less complex than her own.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00146

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0142, USA

Publication date: November 1, 2000

bpl/mila/2000/00000015/00000005/art00002
dcterms_title,dcterms_description,pub_keyword
6
5
20
40
5

Access Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
ingentaconnect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more