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Functionalism and Self-Consciousness

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I offer a philosophically well-motivated work-around for a problem that George Bealer (‘Self-consciousness’, Philosophical Review v. 106, 1997) has identified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism. The problem concerns how to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental predicates occur within the scopes of other mental predicates. My central claim is that the functional roles in terms of which a creature capable of self-consciousness identifies her own mental states must be roles that items could play within creatures whose psychology is less complex than her own.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0142, USA

Publication date: 2000-11-01

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