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Functionalism and Self-Consciousness

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Abstract:

I offer a philosophically well-motivated work-around for a problem that George Bealer (‘Self-consciousness’, Philosophical Review v. 106, 1997) has identified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism. The problem concerns how to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental predicates occur within the scopes of other mental predicates. My central claim is that the functional roles in terms of which a creature capable of self-consciousness identifies her own mental states must be roles that items could play within creatures whose psychology is less complex than her own.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00146

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0142, USA

Publication date: November 1, 2000

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