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The Content of Intentions

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Abstract:

By distinguishing between prior intentions and intentions in action, Searle has helped solve a number of difficulties confronted by the earlier versions of the causal theory of actions. Yet this distinction also raises important new issues. In particular, once a distinction is posited between two types of intentions, one must specify what the exact nature of their respective contents is and explain how the two types of intentions are connected. I suggest that in addressing those issues we could benefit from the insights provided by recent work in the coginitive neuroscience of action. I try to show how this work can help us give a more precise characterization of the content of intentions in action and bridge the gap between prior intentions and intentions in action.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00142

Affiliations: CREA, École Polytechnique, Paris, France

Publication date: September 1, 2000

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