The Content of Intentions

Author: Patherie, Elisabeth¹

Source: Mind & Language, Volume 15, Number 4, September 2000 , pp. 400-432(33)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

Key:

- Free Content

- New Content

- Subscribed Content

- Free Trial Content

Abstract:

By distinguishing between prior intentions and intentions in action, Searle has helped solve a number of difficulties confronted by the earlier versions of the causal theory of actions. Yet this distinction also raises important new issues. In particular, once a distinction is posited between two types of intentions, one must specify what the exact nature of their respective contents is and explain how the two types of intentions are connected. I suggest that in addressing those issues we could benefit from the insights provided by recent work in the coginitive neuroscience of action. I try to show how this work can help us give a more precise characterization of the content of intentions in action and bridge the gap between prior intentions and intentions in action.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/1468-0017.00142

Affiliations: 1: CREA, École Polytechnique, Paris, France

The full text electronic article is available for purchase. You will be able to download the full text electronic article after payment.

$41.89 plus tax Refund Policy