Pretence, Pretending and Metarepresenting

Author: Currie, Gregory¹

Source: Mind & Language, Volume 13, Number 1, March 1998 , pp. 35-55(21)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

I assess the claim that metarepresentation is a key notion in understanding the nature and development of our capacity to engage in pretence. I argue that the metarepresentational programme is unhelpful in explaining how pretence operates and, in particular, how agents distinguish pretence from belief. I sketch an alternative approach to the relations between pretending and believing. This depends on a distinction between pretending and pretence, and upon the claim that pretence stands to pretending as truth stands to belief.

Document Type: Original article

DOI: 10.1111/1468-0017.00064

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Flinders University of South Australia, GPO Box 2100, Adelaide SA 5001, Australia

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