Fodor and the Inscrutability Problem

Author: Ray G.¹

Source: Mind & Language, Volume 12, Number 3-4, September 1997 , pp. 475-489(15)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

Key:

- Free Content

- New Content

- Subscribed Content

- Free Trial Content

Abstract:

In his 1993 Nicod Lectures, Jerry Fodor proposed a solution to a certain version of the problem of `inscrutability of reference', which problem poses a challenge to a certain naturalistic, computational approach to cognition which Fodor has favoured. The problem is that purely informational accounts of an agent's mental contents cannot discriminate meanings finely enough. Fodor proposes a strategy of solution which appeals to the inferential dispositions of agents to discriminate contents more finely. After a brief exposition of the problem and Fodor's bid for solution, I employ three counterexamples to argue that Fodor's proposal cannot succeed.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Florida, Gainesville FL 32611-8545, USA

The full text article is temporarily unavailable.

We apologise for the inconvenience. Please try again later.