Fodor and the Inscrutability Problem
Author: Ray G.1
Source: Mind & Language, Volume 12, Number 3-4, September 1997 , pp. 475-489(15)
Publisher: Blackwell Publishing
Abstract:
In his 1993 Nicod Lectures, Jerry Fodor proposed a solution to a certain version of the problem of `inscrutability of reference', which problem poses a challenge to a certain naturalistic, computational approach to cognition which Fodor has favoured. The problem is that purely informational accounts of an agent's mental contents cannot discriminate meanings finely enough. Fodor proposes a strategy of solution which appeals to the inferential dispositions of agents to discriminate contents more finely. After a brief exposition of the problem and Fodor's bid for solution, I employ three counterexamples to argue that Fodor's proposal cannot succeed.
Language: English
Document Type: Research article
Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Florida, Gainesville FL 32611-8545, USA

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