Has Fodor Really Changed His Mind on Narrow Content?

Author: Aydede M.

Source: Mind & Language, Volume 12, Number 3-4, September 1997 , pp. 422-458(37)

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Abstract:

In The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I show that there has been no change in Fodor's treatment of Frege cases and cases involving the so-called deferential concepts. And for good reason: his notion of narrow content (1985-91) couldn't explain them. The only apparent change concerns his treatment of Twin Earth cases. However, I argue that the notion of broad content that his purely informational semantics delivers is, in some interesting sense, equivalent to the mapping notion of narrow content he officially gave up. I also critically reconstruct the evolution of Fodor's thinking between 1980 and 1994.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, The University of Chicago, 1010 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, USA

Publication date: 1997-09-01