IngentaConnect Cognitive Penetrability, Rationality and Restricted Simulation

Authors: Stich S.¹; Nichols S.¹

Source: Mind & Language, Volume 12, Number 3-4, September 1997 , pp. 297-326(30)

Abstract:

Heal (1996a) maintains that evidence of cognitive penetrability doesn't determine whether stimulation theory or theory theory wins. Given the wide variety of mechanisms and processes that get called `simulation', we argue that it's not useful to ask `who wins?'. The label `simulation' picks out no natural or theoretically interesting category. We propose a more fine-grained taxonomy and argue that some processes that have been labelled `simulation', e.g., `actual-situation-simulation', clearly do exist, while other processes labelled `simulation', e.g., `pretence-driven-off-line-simulation' are quite controversial. We do concede that evidence of cognitive penetrability isn't decisive evidence against pretence-driven-off-line-simulation. Nonetheless, advocates of pretence-driven-off-line-simulation need to provide some explanation of the experimental evidence of penetrability. We argue that Heal's suggestion that simulation is restricted to `rational' processes is unprincipled, and we offer an alternative proposal for restricted simulation.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NH 08903, USA

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