Can We Believe What We Do Not Understand?

Author: Recanati, François1

Source: Mind & Language, Volume 12, Number 1, March 1997 , pp. 84-100(17)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

In a series of papers, Sperber provides the following analysis of the phenomenon of ill-understood belief (or `quasi-belief', as I call it): (i) the quasi-believer has a validating meta-belief, to the effect that a certain representation is true; yet (ii) that representation does not give rise to a plain belief, because it is `semi-propositional'. In this paper I discuss several aspects of this treatment. In particular, I deny that the representation accepted by the quasi-believer is semantically indeterminate, and I reject Sperber's claim that quasi-belief is a credal attitude distinct from plain belief

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/1468-0017.00037

Affiliations: 1: CREA, Paris, France

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