Boghossian on Reductive Dispositionalism About Content: The Case Strengthened

Author: Miller, Alexander¹

Source: Mind & Language, Volume 12, Number 1, March 1997 , pp. 1-10(10)

Abstract:

Paul Boghossian has recently argued against reductive dispositionalism concerning mental content. However, there is a powerful version of reductive dispositionalism-based on work by Ramsey and Lewis-that Boghossian does not consider. In this paper I argue that Boghossian's arguments can be adapted to apply even to this stronger version of reductionism

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/1468-0017.00033

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, UK

Links for this article

http://www.ingentaconnect.com/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/00000001/art00001
http://openurl.ingenta.com/content?genre=article&issn=0268-1064&volume=12&issue=1&spage=1&epage=10
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00033