Boghossian on Reductive Dispositionalism About Content: The Case Strengthened
Author: Miller, Alexander
Source: Mind & Language, Volume 12, Number 1, March 1997 , pp. 1-10(10)
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Abstract:
Paul Boghossian has recently argued against reductive dispositionalism concerning mental content. However, there is a powerful version of reductive dispositionalism-based on work by Ramsey and Lewis-that Boghossian does not consider. In this paper I argue that Boghossian's arguments can be adapted to apply even to this stronger version of reductionismDocument Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00033
Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, UK
Publication date: 1997-03-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Language & Linguistics , Philosophy
- By this author: Miller, Alexander

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