Boghossian on Reductive Dispositionalism About Content: The Case Strengthened

Author: Miller, Alexander¹

Source: Mind & Language, Volume 12, Number 1, March 1997 , pp. 1-10(10)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

Key:

- Free Content

- New Content

- Subscribed Content

- Free Trial Content

Abstract:

Paul Boghossian has recently argued against reductive dispositionalism concerning mental content. However, there is a powerful version of reductive dispositionalism-based on work by Ramsey and Lewis-that Boghossian does not consider. In this paper I argue that Boghossian's arguments can be adapted to apply even to this stronger version of reductionism

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/1468-0017.00033

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, UK

The full text electronic article is available for purchase. You will be able to download the full text electronic article after payment.

$41.72 plus tax Refund Policy