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Feminist Epistemology, Contextualism, and Philosophical Skepticism

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Abstract:

This essay explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, I argue that a feminist contextualist epistemology may solve many of the difficulties facing recent contextualist responses to skepticism. Philosophical skepticism appears to succeed in casting doubt on the very possibility of knowledge by shifting our attention to abnormal contexts. I argue that this shift in context constitutes an attempt to exercise unearned social and epistemic power and that it should be resisted on epistemic and pragmatic grounds. I conclude that skepticism is a problem that feminists can and should take up as they address the social aspects of traditional epistemological problems.
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Keywords: contextualism; feminist epistemology; skepticism; social epistemology

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Philosophy DepartmentRochester Institute of Technology, 92 Lomb Memorial Dr. Rochester, NY 14623, USA, Email: [email protected]

Publication date: 2009-10-01

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