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VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC LUCK, REVISITED

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Abstract:

In this article I return to an argument that I presented in earlier work to the effect that virtue epistemology is at worse false and at best unmotivated. In the light of recent responses to this argument from such figures as John Greco, Guy Axtell, and Kelly Becker, I here re-state and re-evaluate this argument. In the process the original argument is refined and supplemented in key respects and some of the main charges against it are shown to be unfounded. Nevertheless, I also argue that at least one of the objections to the original argument—due to Becker—may well be on the right lines, and I draw some conclusions in this regard.
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Keywords: epistemology; luck; reliabilism; virtue

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, EH8 9JX, Scotland, United Kingdom, Email: [email protected]

Publication date: 2008-01-01

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