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Bernard Gert argues that legitimate moral disagreement calls for tolerance and moral humility; when there is more than one morally acceptable course of action, then intolerance and what Gert calls “moral arrogance” would be objectionable. This article identifies some possible difficulties in distinguishing moral arrogance from moral reform and then examines Gert's treatment of abortion as a contemporary example of moral disagreement that he characterizes as irresolvable.
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Keywords: abortion; arrogance; moral arrogance; moral disagreement; moral reform; reform

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Hofstra University, Heger Hall, Hempstead, NY 11550-1090, USA., Email:

Publication date: 2007-07-01

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