BELIEF AND PRETENSE: A REPLY TO GENDLER

Author: BLAAUW, MARTIJN

Source: Metaphilosophy, Volume 37, Number 2, April 2006 , pp. 204-209(6)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

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Abstract:

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In cases of imaginative contagion, imagining something has doxastic or doxastic-like consequences. In this reply to Tamar Szabó Gendler's article in this collection, I investigate what the philosophical consequences of these cases could be. I argue (i) that imaginative contagion has consequences for how we should understand the nature of imagination and (ii) that imaginative contagion has consequences for our understanding of what belief-forming mechanisms there are. Along the way, I make some remarks about what the consequences of the contagion cases are for the relation between knowledge and imagination.

Keywords: imaginative contagion; belief; knowledge

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2006.00435.x

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Old Brewery, High Street, Aberdeen AB24 3UB, Scotland , Email: m.blaauw@abdn.ac.uk

Publication date: 2006-04-01

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