BELIEF AND PRETENSE: A REPLY TO GENDLER
In cases of imaginative contagion, imagining something has doxastic or doxastic-like consequences. In this reply to Tamar Szabó Gendler's article in this collection, I investigate what the philosophical consequences of these cases could be. I argue (i) that imaginative contagion has consequences for how we should understand the nature of imagination and (ii) that imaginative contagion has consequences for our understanding of what belief-forming mechanisms there are. Along the way, I make some remarks about what the consequences of the contagion cases are for the relation between knowledge and imagination.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Old Brewery, High Street, Aberdeen AB24 3UB, Scotland , Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Publication date: 2006-04-01