DENNETT ON FREEDOM
Author: Mele, Alfred R.
Source: Metaphilosophy, Volume 36, Number 4, July 2005 , pp. 414-426(13)
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Abstract:
: In his Freedom Evolves (2003) Daniel Dennett criticizes a view I defend in Autonomous Agents (1995) about the importance of agents' histories for autonomy, freedom, and moral responsibility and defends a competing view. Our disagreement on this issue is the major focus of this article. Additional topics are manipulation, avoidance, and avoidability.Keywords: agents' histories; autonomy; avoidability; avoidance; compatibilism; Dennett; free will; manipulation; moral responsibility
Document Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00380.x
Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 323061500, USA , Email: almele@mailer.fsu.edu
Publication date: 2005-07-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Philosophy
- By this author: Mele, Alfred R.

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