A REFUTATION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM

Author: Guay, Robert

Source: Metaphilosophy, Volume 36, Number 3, April 2005 , pp. 348-362(15)

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Abstract:

This article argues that consequentialism does not work as a comprehensive theory of right action. The argument is that what course of action maximizes the good makes sense only within a particular context, but that it is impossible to supply such a context while adhering to a global consistency requirement. A global consistency requirement merely specifies the demand for maximization: it insists that an individual action, in order to be morally right, must be optimific relative not only to a set of temporally and spatially local alternatives but also to all future possibilities that the action would preclude. I further argue that an appropriate context is impossible to provide because act consequentialism invokes incompatible temporal horizons, that of action and that of a maximizable good. The incompatibility between these two horizons makes it impossible for there to be any morally salient, consistent assignment of consequences to actions, and thus renders act consequentialism empty.

Keywords: consequentialism; utilitarianism; integrity; ethics

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00373.x

Affiliations: 1: 713 Anderson Hall, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122, USA , Email: r_guay@hotmail.com

Publication date: 2005-04-01