Author: Knight D.

Source: Metaphilosophy, Volume 28, Numbers 1-2, January 1997 , pp. 63-80(18)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

Abstract:

Intentional, ‘commonsense,’ or ‘folk’ psychology is, as Jerry Fodor has remarked, ubiquitous. Explanations of what we say and do in terms of our reasons for acting are the stock in trade of intentional psychology. But there is a question whether explanations in terms of reasons are properly explanatory. Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett, to name two, have defended intentional psychology and its reason-explanations. Still, many philosophers – including Fodor, Davidson and Dennett – fail to pay due attention to the narrative basis of such agent-centered accounts of action. In this paper, I argue that psychological explanation is an agent-centered, narrative-based interpretive practice. To make my case, I present a poetics of psychological explanation: seven elements which collectively describe what makes psychological explanations work. Narrative form allows us to represent the temporal arc of agents’ actions – as well as the temporal arc of their reasoning about their actions, both prospective and retrospective. It allows us to negotiate between the canonical and the exceptional in human experience, and thus to account for actions that strike us as puzzling or unusual – whether the puzzle originates in our suboptimal understanding or the agent's suboptimal reasoning. And it allows us to juxtapose different perspectives on any action. Such juxtapositioning gives us a mechanism for coming to see how an action that strikes us as misguided might have been construed by the agent as reasonable given her understanding of her circumstances. After establishing the seven elements of the poetics, I address the objection that narrative-based accounts of intentional action are not properly explanatory.

Keywords: Connectionism; Connectionist Network; Cognition; Cognitive Science; Computation; Dynamics; Dynamical System; Eliminativism; Folk Psychology; Foundations of Cognitive Science; Language of Thought; Mind; Neural Network

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9973.00041

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada

Publication date: 1997-01-01

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