Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science

Author: Horgan T.1

Source: Metaphilosophy, Volume 28, Numbers 1-2, January 1997 , pp. 1-30(30)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content

Abstract:

This is an overview of recent philosophical discussion about connectionism and the foundations of cognitive science. Connectionist modeling in cognitive science is described. Three broad conceptions of the mind are characterized, and their comparative strengths and weaknesses are discussed: (1) the classical computation conception in cognitive science; (2) a popular foundational interpretation of connectionism that John Tienson and I call “non-sentential computationalism”; and (3) an alternative interpretation of connectionism we call “dynamical cognition.” Also discussed are two recent philosophical attempts to enlist connectionism in defense of eliminativism about folk psychology.

Keywords: Connectionism; Connectionist Network; Cognition; Cognitive Science; Computation; Dynamics; Dynamical System; Eliminativism; Folk Psychology; Foundations of Cognitive Science; Language of Thought; Mind; Neural Network

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/1467-9973.00039

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, USA

The full text electronic article is available for purchase. You will be able to download the full text electronic article after payment.

$41.89 plus tax      Refund Policy

 

OR

Back to top

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content
Share this item with others: These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
Page Help Click here for Page Help
Shopping cart
Tools
Sign in






Need to register?
Sign up here
Text size: A | A | A | A