Author: Horgan T.

Source: Metaphilosophy, Volume 28, Numbers 1-2, January 1997 , pp. 1-30(30)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

Abstract:

This is an overview of recent philosophical discussion about connectionism and the foundations of cognitive science. Connectionist modeling in cognitive science is described. Three broad conceptions of the mind are characterized, and their comparative strengths and weaknesses are discussed: (1) the classical computation conception in cognitive science; (2) a popular foundational interpretation of connectionism that John Tienson and I call “non-sentential computationalism”; and (3) an alternative interpretation of connectionism we call “dynamical cognition.” Also discussed are two recent philosophical attempts to enlist connectionism in defense of eliminativism about folk psychology.

Keywords: Connectionism; Connectionist Network; Cognition; Cognitive Science; Computation; Dynamics; Dynamical System; Eliminativism; Folk Psychology; Foundations of Cognitive Science; Language of Thought; Mind; Neural Network

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9973.00039

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, USA

Publication date: 1997-01-01

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