Beyond the Rule of Law? Decentered Regulation in Online Investing
This paper considers online investing regulation that displays decentered (as opposed to state-centric) characteristics with varying intensity. Though such regulation responds to the contemporary demand for regulation to be flexible, facilitative, and effective, it is short on democracy in creation and implementation. It lacks traditional mechanisms of accountability and so may be seen as less legitimate. These difficulties are investigated by reflecting on the degree to which decentered regulation conforms to the rule-of-law ideal, or to the values underlying the ideal. There is some reason to hope for functional equivalence with rule-of-law values in decentered mechanisms close to the state. However, those further away lack the institutional development to deliver political or legal accountability being particularly weak in the recognition and support of individual rights. Here, we should try to design state law to connect decentered forms to public justice and debate.
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Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: 01 July 2004