EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL YARDSTICK COMPETITION IN FRANCE USING A TWO-REGIME SPATIAL DURBIN MODEL WITH FIXED EFFECTS
This research proposes a two-regime spatial Durbin model with spatial and time-period fixed effects to test for political yardstick competition and exclude any other explanation that might produce spatial interaction effects among the dependent variable, the independent variables, or the error term. The study also derives the maximum likelihood estimator and variance–covariance matrix of the parameters of this model. Data pertaining to welfare spending by 93 departments in France during 1992–2000 provide significant empirical evidence in support of political yardstick competition. Departments governed by a small political majority mimic neighboring expenditures on welfare to a greater extent than do departments governed by a large political majority.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: 1: Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, P.O. Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands., Email: [email protected] 2: Faculty of Economics, University of Rennes, 7 Place Hoche, 35065 Rennes, France., Email: [email protected]
Publication date: 2009-12-01