Who Gave Soft Money? The Effect of Interest Group Resources on Political Contributions

Authors: Apollonio, D. E.; Raja, Raymond J. La

Source: The Journal of Politics, Volume 66, Number 4, November 2004 , pp. 1134-1154(21)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content

Abstract:

We consider the effect of various organizational resources on political contributions. Using a unique data set of soft money contributors from 1997 to 1998, our resource-based model examines how capital, membership, and experience influence the decision to give money to political parties. By observing decision making in a relatively unconstrained regulatory environment typified by the soft money regime, we demonstrate the conventional wisdom that financial resources determine the size of political contributions. Financial wealth, however, does not predict whether an organization will make a contribution in the first place. Instead, we show that a lack of alternative resources makes it more likely that organizations will spend money on politics. These findings have important implications for determining who benefits under various campaign finance rules.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/j.0022-3816.2004.00293.x

The full text electronic article is available for purchase. You will be able to download the full text electronic article after payment.

$41.89 plus tax

 

OR

Back to top

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content
Page Help Click here for Page Help
Shopping cart
Tools
Sign in






Need to register?
Sign up here
Text size: A | A | A | A