Managerial Ability, Compensation, and the Closed-End Fund Discount

Authors: BERK, JONATHAN B.; STANTON, RICHARD

Source: The Journal of Finance, Volume 62, Number 2, April 2007 , pp. 529-556(28)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content

Abstract:

This paper shows that the existence of managerial ability, combined with the labor contract prevalent in the industry, implies that the closed-end fund discount should exhibit many of the primary features documented in the literature. We evaluate the model's ability to match the quantitative features of the data, and find that it does well, although there is some observed behavior that remains to be explained.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01216.x

The full text electronic article is available for purchase. You will be able to download the full text electronic article after payment.

$41.72 plus tax

 

OR

Back to top

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content
Page Help Click here for Page Help
Shopping cart
Tools
Sign in






Need to register?
Sign up here
Text size: A | A | A | A