ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED DUOPOLY: WEIGHTED WELFARE AND PRICE COMPETITION
In this paper we analyse the endogenous order of moves in a mixed duopoly for differentiated goods. Firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. The private firm maximises profits while the public firm maximises the weighted sum of the consumer and producer surpluses (weighted welfare). It is shown that the result obtained in equilibrium depends crucially on the weight given to the consumer surplus in weighted welfare and on the degree to which goods are substitutes or complements. We also analyse whether the equilibria obtained maximise the sum of the consumer and producer surpluses or not. Finally we study whether the nationality of the private firm influences the results.
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Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Universidad del País Vasco
Publication date: 01 December 2011