Systems that Should Have Failed: Critical Infrastructure Protection in an Institutionally Fragmented Environment

Authors: de Bruijne, Mark¹; van Eeten, Michel²

Source: Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 15, Number 1, March 2007 , pp. 18-29(12)

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Abstract:

Recent years have witnessed major governmental initiatives regarding critical infrastructure protection (CIP). During that same time, critical infrastructures (CIs) have undergone massive institutional restructuring under the headings of privatization, deregulation and liberalization. Little research has gone into understanding the interactions between these two developments. In this article, we outline the consequences of institutional restructuring for the changing ways in which CIs ensure the reliability and security of their networks and services. Neither Normal Accident Theory nor High-Reliability Theory can account for reliability under these conditions. We then investigate the implications of these findings for CIP.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5973.2007.00501.x

Affiliations: 1: Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands., Email: m.l.c.debruijne@tbm.tudelft.nl 2: Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands., Email: m.j.g.vaneeten@tbm.tudelft.nl

Publication date: 2007-03-01