Skip to main content

Nozick, Prohibition, and No-Fault Motor Insurance

Buy Article:

$51.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

ABSTRACT

No-fault insurance schemes involve prohibiting exercise of the natural rights of individuals to recover damages from those whose negligence causes them harm. Public debate about no-fault emphasises consequentialist benefits, and takes little account of the putative rights of individuals to recovery. I argue, however, that even on a relatively extreme rights-based conception of justice, such as Robert Nozick’s, it may be possible to justify a no-fault scheme. The argument proceeds by: (1) elucidating what compensation the Nozickian must offer in return for prohibiting an activity such as the private recovery of damages; and consequently (2) arguing that there is no prima facie reason to think that the compensation afforded by participation in a no-fault scheme would be any less adequate than that afforded by participation in a system of tort law

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5930.00246

Affiliations: Monash University, Clayton, Victoria Australia

Publication date: October 1, 2003

bpl/japp/2003/00000020/00000002/art00006
dcterms_title,dcterms_description,pub_keyword
6
5
20
40
5

Access Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
ingentaconnect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more