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Uniqueness, Individuality, and Human Cloning

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Abstract:

This paper challenges two main arguments often presented to show that cloning a human being would be morally wrong per se. These arguments are that human cloning would be intrinsically wrong 1) because it involves manufacturing a person rather than creating or reproducing one, and 2) because it violates some claim or right that individuals have to be biologically unique. I argue that while cloning may involve genetic selection, it need not always be a decision to select for a certain type of individual. Furthermore, I contend that the notion of biological uniqueness is inadequate to ground either the idea that biologically non-unique individuals are morally worse off than unique ones or that biological uniqueness itself constitutes a criterion of moral value or status.

Document Type: Original Article

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5930.00092

Affiliations: University of Regina, Saskatchewan

Publication date: 1998-01-01

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