Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United States

Author: Whang, Taehee

Source: International Studies Quarterly, Volume 55, Number 3, 1 September 2011 , pp. 787-801(15)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

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Abstract:

Why do we observe economic sanctions despite strong doubts regarding their effectiveness? While the symbolic use of sanctions is advanced as an alternative to the instrumental use explanation, no one has assessed this alternative explanation empirically. I investigate the symbolic use of sanctions for domestic political gain in the United States, assessing in particular the effect of sanctions imposition on US presidential approval ratings. Findings suggest that policymakers benefit from imposing sanctions through increased domestic support. This domestic political gain can present policymakers with an incentive to use sanctions as a low‐cost way of displaying strong leadership during international conflicts.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00668.x

Affiliations: Texas A&M University

Publication date: September 1, 2011

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