Do Analysts Influence Corporate Financing and Investment?

Authors: Doukas, John A.1; Kim, Chansog (Francis)2; Pantzalis, Christos3

Source: Financial Management, Volume 37, Number 2, Summer 2008 , pp. 303-339(37)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

We examine whether abnormal analyst coverage influences the external financing and investment decisions of the firm. Controlling for self-selection bias in analysts' excessive coverage, we find that firms with high (low) analyst coverage consistently engage in higher (lower) external financing than do their industry peers of similar size. Our evidence also demonstrates that firms with excessive analyst coverage overinvest and realize lower future returns than do firms with low analyst coverage. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts favor the coverage of firms that have the potential to engage in profitable investment-banking business.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-053X.2008.00014.x

Affiliations: 1: John Doukas is a Professor of Finance at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, VA. 2: Chansog (Francis) Kim is an Associate Professor of Accountancy at the City University of Hong Kong in Kowloon, Hong Kong. 3: Christos Pantzalis is an Associate Professor of Finance at the University of South Florida in Tampa, FL.

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