The Authority of Avowals and the Concept of Belief

Author: Hamilton, Andy¹

Source: European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 1, April 2000 , pp. 20-39(20)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

The pervasive dispositional model of belief is misguided. It fails to acknowledge the authority of first-person ascriptions or avowals of belief, and the “decision principle”- that having decided the question whether p, there is, for me, no further question whether I believe that p. The dilemma is how one can have immediate knowledge of a state extended in time; its resolution lies in the expressive character of avowals - which does not imply a non-assertoric thesis - and their non-cognitive status. The common claim that there are higher-order beliefs concerning ones present beliefs is rejected as unintelligible. The decision principle is defended against claims of “unconscious belief”; there is no interesting such category, since all beliefs are liable at some time to be considered, but mostly to be out of mind. Belief is not constituted by a disposition, but is connected with dispositions - it is an “attitude concept”.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/1468-0378.00099

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Durham University, UK

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