@article {Hamilton:April 2000:0966-8373:20,
	author = "Hamilton, Andy",
	title = "The Authority of Avowals and the Concept of Belief",
	journal = "European Journal of Philosophy",
	volume = "8",
	year = "April 2000",
	abstract = "The pervasive dispositional model of belief is misguided. It fails to acknowledge the authority of first-person ascriptions or avowals of belief, and the “decision principle”- that having decided the question whether p, there is, for me, no further question whether I believe that p. The dilemma is how one can have immediate knowledge of a state extended in time; its resolution lies in the expressive character of avowals - which does not imply a non-assertoric thesis - and their non-cognitive status. The common claim that there are higher-order beliefs concerning ones present beliefs is rejected as unintelligible. The decision principle is defended against claims of “unconscious belief”; there is no interesting such category, since all beliefs are liable at some time to be considered, but mostly to be out of mind. Belief is not constituted by a disposition, but is connected with dispositions - it is an “attitude concept”.",
	pages = "20-39(20)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/ejop/2000/00000008/00000001/art00002"
	doi = "doi:10.1111/1468-0378.00099"
}