How Do We Know Necessary Truths? Kant's Answer

Author: Hanna, Robert

Source: European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 6, Number 2, August 1998 , pp. 115-145(31)

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Abstract:

It is traditionally held that our knowledge of necessity is a priori; but the familiar theories of a priori knowledge - platonism and conventionalism - have now been discredited, and replaced by either modal skepticism or a posteriori essentialism. The main thesis of this paper is that Kant's theory of a priori knowledge, when detached from his transcendental idealism, offers a genuine alternative to these unpalatable options. According to Kant's doctrine, all epistemic necessity (which he calls “conviction” (Ueberzeugung) is grounded directly or indirectly on our capacity for clear and distinct rational intuition (which he calls “insight” (Einsicht). Insight, in turn, depends upon functions of the imagination for creating “mental models” of necessary truths. This doctrine is well exemplified by Kant's account of our knowledge of simple analytic truths.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0378.00054

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3 hanna@nexus.yorku.ca

Publication date: 1998-08-01