THE STRATEGIC TIMING OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY

Author: MEREDITH, MARC

Source: Economics and Politics, Volume 21, Number 1, March 2009 , pp. 159-177(19)

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Abstract:

This paper focuses on the strategic timing of elections by agenda-setters in direct democracy settings. Because concurrent elections affect turnout, scheduling referenda for different elections will produce different median voters. I hypothesize that agenda-setters with power over the timing of a referendum will schedule the referendum in conjunction with the other set of races that produce a policy closest to their preferred outcome. Consistent with the theory, I show that Wisconsin school boards' use of special elections for school referenda are related to differences in the revealed preferences of voters in low- and high-turnout elections.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00342.x

Affiliations: 1: Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Publication date: 2009-03-01