A Game-Theoretic Model Of The CouP D'État

Author: Sutter, Daniel

Source: Economics and Politics, Volume 12, Number 2, July 2000 , pp. 205-223(19)

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Abstract:

I explore the comparative vulnerability of regimes to a coup d'état using a game-theoretic model. Analysis centers on leaders of groups capable of intervening at the time of a coup. I prove the existence of an equilibrium in which a coup is attempted without restrictions on current government policy, the breadth of participation in politics, or the relative size of the conspiracy. Comparative statics results concerning the willingness of plotters to stage a coup and other leaders to join a coup once under way are established. Differences in comparative regime vulnerability stem from differences in the amount of organization required to attempt a coup.

Document Type: Original article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00075

Affiliations: 1: Department of Economics, University of Oklahoma, USA

Publication date: 2000-07-01