Rational Adversaries? Evidence from Randomised Trials in One Day Cricket

Author: Bhaskar, V.

Source: The Economic Journal, Volume 119, Number 534, January 2009 , pp. 1-23(23)

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $48.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

In cricket, the right to make an important strategic decision (bat first or field first) is assigned via a coin toss. I use these `randomised trials' to examine the consistency of choices made by teams with strictly opposed preferences and the effects of these choices upon the outcomes in the game. I find significant evidence of inconsistency, with teams often agreeing on who is to bat first. Estimated treatment effects show that choices are often poorly made and reduce the probability of the team winning, a particularly surprising finding given the intensely competitive environment and opportunities for learning.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02203.x

Affiliations: 1: University College London

Publication date: 2009-01-01