Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress

Author: Knight, Brian

Source: The Economic Journal, Volume 118, Number 532, October 2008 , pp. 1785-1803(19)

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Abstract:

This article investigates the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of federal funds. In a legislative bargaining model, we demonstrate that funds are concentrated in high representation areas, and two channels underlie this result. The proposal power channel reflects the role of representation in committee assignments, and the vote cost channel reflects the role of representation in coalition formation. In our empirical analysis, we find that small states, relative to large states, receive more funding in the US Senate, relative to the House. We also find empirical support for the two channels underlying this relationship.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02191.x

Affiliations: 1: Brown University

Publication date: 2008-10-01