Education Policies: Equity, Efficiency and Voting Equilibrium

Author: De Fraja G.

Source: The Economic Journal, Volume 111, Number 471, May 2001 , pp. 104-119(16)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

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Abstract:

This paper investigates the effects of two specific forms of intervention in the market for education: an ability test for admission to university and a subsidy to tuition fees financed through general taxation. Both these measures enhance equality of opportunity, but their equity and efficiency effects are ambiguous. This ambiguity is reflected in the political economy equilibrium which would emerge as the result of voting on the level of the ability test and of the subsidy.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: University of York and CIPR

Publication date: 2001-05-01

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