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Papineau on the Vagueness of Phenomenal Concepts

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Papineau’s argument in Thinking About Consciousness for the vagueness or indeterminacy of phenomenal concepts is discussed. Several problems with his argument are brought out, and it is concluded that his argument fails to establish his desired conclusion.

Document Type: Research Article


Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel;, Email:

Publication date: December 1, 2006

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