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Brentano (and Some Neo-Brentanians) on Inner Consciousness

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Abstract

Brentano’s theory of inner consciousness has recently had a surprising comeback. However, it is still an open question how it is best understood. It is widely held that according to Brentano a mental act is conscious iff it is self-presenting. In contrast, I will argue that Brentano holds that a mental act x is conscious iff it is unified with an immediately evident cognition (‘Erkenntnis’) of x. If one understands Brentano’s theory in this way, it promises to shed light on standard problems for theories of inner consciousness.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: King’s College, Strand, London, WC2R 2LS, UK; mark., Email: [email protected]

Publication date: 01 December 2006

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