Brentano (and Some Neo-Brentanians) on Inner Consciousness

Author: Textor, Mark1

Source: dialectica, Volume 60, Number 4, December 2006 , pp. 411-432(22)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

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Abstract:

Brentano's theory of inner consciousness has recently had a surprising comeback. However, it is still an open question how it is best understood. It is widely held that according to Brentano a mental act is conscious iff it is self-presenting. In contrast, I will argue that Brentano holds that a mental act x is conscious iff it is unified with an immediately evident cognition (`Erkenntnis') of x. If one understands Brentano's theory in this way, it promises to shed light on standard problems for theories of inner consciousness.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01080.x

Affiliations: 1: King's College, Strand, London, WC2R 2LS, UK; mark., Email: textor@kcl.ac.uk

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