Is `Everything' Precise?

Author: LópezdeSa, Dan1

Source: dialectica, Volume 60, Number 4, December 2006 , pp. 397-409(13)

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content

Abstract:

There are certain metaphysically interesting arguments `from vagueness', for unrestricted mereological composition and for four-dimensionalism, which involve a claim to the effect that idioms for unrestricted quantification are precise. An elaboration of Lewis' argument for this claim, which assumes the view of vagueness as semantic indecision, is presented. It is argued that the argument also works according to other views on the nature of vagueness, which also require for an expression to be vague that there are different admissible alternatives of the relevant sort, such as epistemicism, as defended by Williamson. Recent attempts to resist the argument are discussed and rejected.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01077.x

Affiliations: 1: Arché- The AHRC Research Centre for the Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics and Mind (University of St Andrews) and LOGOS - Grup de Recerca en Lògica, Llenguatge i Cognició (Universitat de Barcelona);, Email: dlds@st-andrews.ac.uk.

The full text electronic article is available for purchase. You will be able to download the full text electronic article after payment.

$41.72 plus tax      Refund Policy

 

OR

Back to top

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content
Share this item with others: These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
Page Help Click here for Page Help
Shopping cart
Tools
Sign in






Need to register?
Sign up here
Text size: A | A | A | A