Talking About Intentional Objects

Author: Gorman, Michael

Source: dialectica, Volume 60, Number 2, June 2006 , pp. 135-144(10)

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Abstract:

Tim Crane has recently defended the view that all intentional states have objects, even when these objects do not exist. In this note I first set forth some crucial elements of Crane's view: his reasons for accepting intentional objects, his rejection of certain ways of thinking about them, and his distinction between the `substantial' and the `schematic' notion of an object. I then argue that while Crane's account successfully explains what intentional objects are not, it leaves unexplained how it could make sense to say that intentional objects need not exist. Finally I propose that we can do justice to Crane's reasons for talking about intentional objects by re-interpreting talk about intentional objects as talk about the truth- or satisfaction-conditions of intentional states.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01051.x

Affiliations: 1: School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 20064, USA;, Email: gorman@cua.edu.

Publication date: 2006-06-01